Memory enhancing drugs and Alzheimer’s Disease: Enhancing the self or preventing the loss of it? by Dekkers, Wim & Rikkert, Marcel Olde
Scientiﬁc Contribution
Memory enhancing drugs and Alzheimer’s Disease: Enhancing the self
or preventing the loss of it?
Wim Dekkers
1,*, and Marcel Olde Rikkert
2
1Department of Ethics, Philosophy and History of Medicine 137 Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, PO Box 9101,
6500 HB, Nijmegen, The Netherlands (*author for correspondence, Phone: +31-24-3615320; fax: +31-24-3540254; e-mail:
w.dekkers@efg.umcn.nl);
2Department of Geriatric Medicine Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre/Alzheimer Centre
Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Abstract. In this paper we analyse some ethical and philosophical questions related to the development of
memory enhancing drugs (MEDs) and anti-dementia drugs. The world of memory enhancement is
coloured by utopian thinking and by the desire for quicker, sharper, and more reliable memories.
Dementia is characterized by decline, fragility, vulnerability, a loss of the most important cognitive
functions and even a loss of self. While MEDs are being developed for self-improvement, in Alzheimer’s
Disease (AD) the self is being lost. Despite this it is precisely those patients with AD and other forms of
dementia that provide the subjects for scientiﬁc research on memory improvement. Biomedical research in
the ﬁeld of MEDs and anti-dementia drugs appears to provide a strong impetus for rethinking what we
mean by ‘memory’, ‘enhancement’, ‘therapy’, and ‘self’. We conclude (1) that the enhancement of memory
is still in its infancy, (2) that current MEDs and anti-dementia drugs are at best partially and minimally
eﬀective under speciﬁc conditions, (3) that ‘memory’ and ‘enhancement’ are ambiguous terms, (4) that
there is no clear-cut distinction between enhancement and therapy, and (5) that the research into MEDs
and anti-dementia drugs encourages a reductionistic view of the human mind and of the self.
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Introduction
For several centuries memory enhancement has
been a theme for science ﬁction, but we are now
emerging into a period of successful interventions
based on an increasing understanding of the
neurobiological basis of memory. Possibilities for
drug development have stimulated the interest of
biomedical researchers and pharmaceutical com-
panies in both basic and translational research over
the last two decades. Recognizing the desire for
quicker, sharper, and more reliable memories,
many researchers are explicitly pursuing drugs that
might improve our capacity to remember (Farah
et al., 2004). Based on our neurobiological and
neuropsychological knowledge of memory func-
tion, huge research eﬀorts are being directed to the
development of memory enhancing drugs (MEDs).
Scanning the literature on MEDs reveals two
crucial aspects. First, memory enhancement is
coloured by utopian thinking (Gordijn, 2006). The
development of MEDs falls into the class of self-
improvements, where people are trying to improve
all kinds of mental and bodily capacities, trying to
work outways oflivinglonger, beingmore beautiful
and more intelligent, being stronger, faster and
better. Memory enhancement reminds us of the old
utopias of an improved human life, aimed at
‘‘ageless bodies, happy souls, better children, a
more peaceful and cooperative society,’’ in the
words of Leon Kass, chairman of the U.S. Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics (Kass, 2003, p. 11).
1 In
the world of memory enhancement people speak in
terms of ‘‘cosmetic neurology’’ (Chatterjee, 2004),
‘‘smart drugs’’, ‘‘viagra for the brain’’ (http://www.
nootropics.com/smartdrugs/brainviagra.html) and
even ‘‘mind-enhancing drugs’’.
The second crucial aspect of the literature is the
connection between the development of MEDs and
that of anti-dementia drugs. On the one hand, the
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‘anti-dementia’,ontheother‘non-medical’and‘anti-
aging’. There is an overlap between these two aims
founded on the assumption that a decline in memory
capacity is not conﬁned to patients with dementia or
other neurological diseases, but happens to all
human beings as they age. This normal deterioration
of memory is considered to be caused by a failure of
the same biochemical mechanisms that break down
in pathological conditions such as Alzheimer’s
Disease (AD). Although much of the MED research
is aimed at ﬁnding treatments for dementia, there is
reason to believe that some of the products under
development may also enhance normal memory,
particularlyin middleand old agewhenmanypeople
have memory complaints and show a certain degree
of memory decline. Similarly MEDs under develop-
ment for people without dementia might also be
helpful for people suffering from dementia.
In this paper we focus on this connection between
the search for MEDs and for anti-dementia drugs.
We will show that, although there is an overlap
between these two ﬁelds of research, there is also a
conﬂict of interests. While MEDs are being devel-
oped to improve oneself, in AD ‘one loses one self’.
DespitethisitispreciselypatientswithADandother
forms of dementia that are the subjects of scientiﬁc
research in the ﬁeld of memory enhancement.
In the next section we describe the current
research in the ﬁeld of MEDs. After a short
overview of various ethical and philosophical
questions related to MEDs, we then concentrate
on the following issues: (1) memory and its
disturbances, particularly the ethical implications
of the work on MEDs, (2) the distinction between
therapy and enhancement, (3) various interpreta-
tions of the self related to research into memory
and MEDs, and (4) the relationship between
MEDs and anti-dementia drugs. We end up with
some considerations about the further develop-
ment of MEDs in relation to AD.
Research into MEDs
It is well known that memory can be improved by
physical and social activities, by taking ampheta-
mines, sugar, caffeine, or herbal drugs (Breithaupt
and Weigmann, 2004). Simply walking sedately for
half an hour three times a week is associated with
better learning, concentration and abstract reason-
ing abilities. Elderly people who walk regularly
perform better on memory tests than their
sedentary peers (Heyn et al., 2004). Even dunking
one’s hand in freezing water may have a positive
eﬀect on the capacity to remember new informa-
tion, at least in the short term. It appears from
these examples that the complexity of the human
body and especially the human brain makes it
diﬃcult to isolate the functions of memory from
other neurophysiological processes such as percep-
tion, attention, and arousal. Many non-speciﬁc
drugs or stimulants have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
memory and many ‘memory drugs’ have a signif-
icant eﬀect on other bodily functions.
Memory enhancement research was primarily
focused on neurodegenerative diseases such as AD,
because one of the characteristic features of AD is a
progressivelossofmemory.Cholinergicmechanisms
are involved in memory formation and cholinergic
cells are amongst the ﬁrst to die in AD patients. This
has led to therapeutic interventions with a class of
drugs called anticholinesterase drugs or acetylcholin-
esterase inhibitors such as tacrine, donepezil and
rivastigmine. These agents block the enzyme that
metabolizes acetylcholine, with the result that ace-
tylcholine, once released, remains active in the
synapse for a longer period of time. These drugs
have had a real but limited eﬀect on slowing down
the decline of memory in some Alzheimer patients.
They can slow down or moderate the eﬀects of the
disease, but they do not reverse the progressive
degeneration of the brain itself (Breithaupt and
Weismann, 2004; Marshall, 2004).
A new generation of memory enhancers is
promising to be more speciﬁc and powerful (Russo,
2002). New drugs in the development pipeline act
on other compounds in the biochemical pathway
that encodes memory, for example drugs that
modulate AMPA-receptors, the so-called ampakin-
es. There is empirical evidence in animal studies
that ampakines selectively enhance the encoding of
both short- and long-term memory (Lynch, 2002),
but – again – none of these drugs tackles the
degeneration of the brain itself.
Recent research in animals has also improved
our understanding of certain molecular and genetic
‘‘switches’’ that control memory. These discoveries
have launched several new pharmaceutical compa-
nies formed speciﬁcally to develop potential
drugs based on this research. In this category are
drugs that increase cyclic AMP-responsive element
binding protein (CREB), the activity of which is
known to contribute to important neuronal
functions, such as synaptic plasticity, learning
and memory (Farah et al., 2004).
In magazines, books, newsletters, and on the
internet, ‘‘smart drug enthusiasts’’ cite an impres-
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but the question is whether any of the substances
advertised as so-called ‘‘smart drugs’’ really work?
And what does ‘work’ then mean? Steven Rose
(2002) has examined over 100 studies, some on
animals, some on people with dementia, some on
healthy people (Rose, 2002, 2005b). Rose rightly
emphasizes that memory is not some mechanical
process like recovering ﬁles from a computer disk,
but involves active work on the part of the
individual. Our wish for ‘magic potions’ to
enhance our ‘wisdom’ is age old, he argues, but
so far, drugs tested in humans have proved to be
ineﬀective in enhancing learning and memory. We
think that this statement is too strong. Although
clinically relevant questions – such as can acetyl-
cholinesterase inhibitors (AChIs) also be pre-
scribed in case of a delirium or a Lewy Body
Dementia? – remain insuﬃciently studied, the
AChI donepezil has shown some eﬃcacy in AD
patients (Gerlai, 2003). However, several studies
on the eﬀect of donepezil on healthy elderly
individuals did not show a signiﬁcant improve-
ment in cognitive performance compared to a
placebo group. Sometimes even a transient mild
worsening on some cognitive tests during donepe-
zil administration was observed (Beglinger et al.,
2004, 2005).
2
In a time when the ideal of Evidence Based
Medicine is paramount, we cannot pass over the
need for an adequate scientiﬁc methodology. Most
of the studies analysed by Rose appeared to be
either misleadingly quoted by advocates of smart
drugs or describe experiments that were poorly
controlled or misinterpreted by researchers. Much
of the evidence cited by smart drug enthusiasts
comes from animal experiments that can only test a
drug’s effects on learning, not on memory. The
animals are trained to perform highly speciﬁc tasks
and the drugs are given within an hour or so of the
training trials. On this basis, the best a smart drug
could do is to increase the likelihood of the transfer
of information from the short-term to long-term
memory store. There is little evidence that any of
these smart drugs can do even this much in
humans. But there is more to this issue. Many
studies of MEDs involve patients frequently diag-
nosed as suffering from AD. Effects on the patients
are often evaluated using subjective criteria. Many
of the trials are based on small samples of patients.
According to Rose, a considerable number of the
human studies comes from trials carried out in
countries where the ethical controls and statistical
procedures required in standard biomedical
research are often lacking, or at least unspeciﬁed.
The most dramatic claims often appear in
conference proceedings that were not under peer
review or in obscure journals.
All in all we cannot but conclude that memory
enhancement is still in its infancy, that we have
only partially effective drugs, and that it is not
necessarily an unalloyed good. All of this work on
MEDs – exciting though it may be for researchers,
people with dementia, their caretakers and the
general public – is very preliminary. Its signiﬁcance
for producing biotechnologies that might preserve
or enhance human memory remains to be deter-
mined. So far, there seems to be no efﬁcacious
‘‘magic bullet’’ for producing better memories.
Philosophical questions
The philosophical and ethical aspects of enhance-
ment of cognition in general and of MEDs in
particular have already been extensively discussed
in the literature.
3 Ethical issues surrounding
cognitive enhancement can be grouped into three
general categories (Farah, 2005; Farah and
Wolpe, 2004). The ﬁrst is safety. Side eﬀects and
unintended consequences are a concern with all
medications and medical procedures, but in com-
parison to other comparable elective treatments
such as cosmetic surgery, neuroscience-based
enhancement involves intervening in a far more
complex system. We are therefore at greater risk of
unanticipated problems when we try to change the
function of the human brain. The second category
is social: how will the lives of all individuals,
including those who chose not to enhance them-
selves, be inﬂuenced by living in a society with
widespread enhancement? Even in everyday work
and school contexts, enhancement is likely to aﬀect
all of us. The freedom not to enhance may be
diﬃcult to maintain in a society where one com-
petes by using enhancements. Conversely, barriers
such as costs will prevent some people who would
like to enhance from doing so. This could exacer-
bate the disadvantages already faced by people of
low socioeconomic status in education and
employment. The third category of ethical issues
could be called philosophical in that it concerns our
norms and values and our sense of self. We
generally view self-improvement as a laudable
goal. At the same time, improving our natural
endowments for traits such as attention span runs
the risk of making commodities of those traits. We
generally encourage innovations that save time and
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tive and to direct our eﬀorts toward potentially
more worthy goals. However, when we improve
our productivity by taking a pill, we may also
undermine the value and dignity of hard work and
medicalize human eﬀort.
The focus of our paper is on what Farah (2005)
calls ‘‘philosophical questions.’’ More particularly,
we will deal with a number of – what we would like
to call – ‘‘questions of meaning and understand-
ing.’’ Memory research and the development of
MEDs raise signiﬁcant questions about human
nature itself and human self-understanding. Some
ﬁne examples of these questions are mentioned in a
staﬀ working paper of the U.S. President’s Com-
mission on Bioethics (PCBE): ‘‘What does it mean
to be the creature that remembers and forgets, that
studies and wonders about memory, and that seeks
to manipulate and control the way we remember?
Is memory decline actually ‘normal’ for particular
age groups? What would it mean to have a ‘perfect’
memory? Why do we so often remember what we
would like to forget, and forget what we would like
to remember?’’ (PCBE, 2005).
What is a better memory?
Any effort to understand human memory, let alone
improve it, must confront the fact that memory is
not a singular phenomenon. Neither is it mediated
by a single neurobiological or neuropsychological
system. There are many types of remembering and
forgetting. We remember how to ride a bicycle,
how to drive home from work, we remember
phone numbers, the names of old classmates, the
day we were married, and how to speak a foreign
language. These are surely all acts of memory, but
each of them involves different ways of remember-
ing, and each of them has a different meaning.
Besides the well-known distinction between
long-term and short-term memory, current psy-
chological theory divides long-term memory into a
so-called implicit and explicit memory, that is, in
‘remembering how’ and ‘remembering that’
(Ledoux, 2002, p. 98–103; Rose, 2005a). Implicit
(or procedural, non-declarative) memories are
reﬂected in the way we act more than in what we
consciously know. Remembering how to ride a
bicycle is implicit. Only the most severe of memory
disorders such as those that show up in the
advanced stages of AD aﬀect implicit memory.
People with memory disturbances can usually
recall how to perform daily activities such as
putting on clothes and cooking, even when they
cannot subsequently describe what they have done.
Remembering that a two-wheeled vehicle with a
saddle and a handlebar is called a bicycle is explicit.
The information gathered by our explicit (or
declarative) memory is available for conscious
recollection. Through explicit memory one can
recall a phone number, the way someone looks,
what one had for lunch yesterday, or what one did
on one’s last birthday. It is this memory that is ﬁrst
attacked in AD.
4
All these models of memory are neither ﬁxed
nor mutually exclusive. Memory can fail in many
different ways. A very rough distinction of memory
problems is the one between intrusive and bad
memories on the one hand and weak or lost
memories on the other (PCBE, 2005). Some bad
memories may be so traumatic that they destroy the
lives of those who suﬀer from them. Many of us
have felt a momentary desire to escape the sting of
a shameful, embarrassing, or painful memory. The
goal of many therapeutic interventions in psychi-
atry and psychology is to numb the emotional
signiﬁcance of certain bad memories. The memory
enhancing drugs (MEDs) we focus on in this paper
refer to weak or lost memories. AD is often
considered the most blatant example of a declining
personal memory that may progress to the total
destruction of personal memories and the total loss
of self-consciousness. Thus, in AD and other cases
of age-related memory decline, the desire for a
better memory involves the restoration of some-
thing that is being lost.
One such other category of age-related non-
speciﬁc memory decline is called Mild Cognitive
Impairment (MCI). MCI involves the slowing
down that comes with human ageing, but more
quickly or severely than normal. This decline often
begins with a reduced ability to remember present
names and facts by reducing the capacity to
remember past experiences. MCI is deﬁned as
memory loss without any signiﬁcant functional
impairment (Petersen et al., 2001). The majority of
MCI patients eventually develop AD. There are
reasons to believe that MEDs might be eﬀective
treatment for MCI and for other kinds of age-
related memory decline (Lynch, 2002), but
attempts to improve the memory of these patients
have not yet been very successful (Petersen et al.,
2005).
Despite this, the commercial potential for mem-
ory enhancers is immense. Most drugs in develop-
ment are designed to help people with AD and
other brain disorders, but there is also a huge
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who simply want to enhance their powers of
memory rather than treat memory loss. MEDs
are not only ‘‘looking for diseases’’ (Vos, 1989),
but are also being aimed at the milder, ‘normal’
memory based disturbances of daily life.
The crucial problem is that it is difﬁcult to
design experiments that test the effects of MEDs,
when there are so many indirect inﬂuences on
mental performance. Elderly people, living in
institutions, who cannot remember what they had
for breakfast that morning may be able to recall
childhood episodes with great clarity. Have they
lost memory, or have they lost interest in institu-
tional food, where one breakfast may be just like
another? In addition to suffering memory loss,
elderly patients in hospital, especially those with
dementia, are often angry, suspicious, anxious or
depressed. A drug that reduced such feelings could
easily result in an apparent improvement in mem-
ory, while having no effect on the actual mecha-
nisms of memory (Rose, 2002).
Another problem to be sorted out is what
advocates of smart drugs really mean by ‘‘improv-
ing memory’’ or ‘‘enhancing cognition.’’ Memory
enhancement as discussed in this paper has more to
do with our neurobiological capacity to store
certain experiences and to remember things
(or not to forget things), than with enhancing the
content of our memories.
If we broaden the scope a bit in order to try to
understand the meaning of our memory, one of the
more crucial questions about meaning and under-
standing is about what is meant by a ‘‘better
memory.’’ To speak about ‘‘better memories’’ is to
imply some notion of ‘‘best’’ or ‘‘perfect’’ memory.
Unfortunately it is not easy to specify what having
a ‘‘perfect’’ memory would mean. The U.S.
President’s Council on Bioethics (PCBE) speciﬁed
three interpretations in a Staff working paper
(PCBE, 2005).
One interpretation is that an individual with a
perfect memory would never forget anything.H e
would remember every fact, every face, every
encounter, every piece of information. It does not
take much reﬂection to see that such indiscriminate
and perfect recall would be not a blessing but a
curse. Second, a perfect memory might mean
remembering only what we desire, or what we ﬁnd
desirable when we experience it. This interpretation
is problematic too. For much that is most worth
remembering is not by nature desirable and much
that seems undesirable when we ﬁrst experience it,
only reveals its true signiﬁcance, meaning, or value
in our lives much later. Third, a perfect memory
might mean remembering things as they really are
or as they actually happened. This seems better,
though giving an account of what this might
actually mean is rather diﬃcult. It does have its
own imperfections. To remember things as they are
oﬀers no guidance about what is worth remember-
ing. It provides no insight into the diﬀerence
between simply cataloguing events (the brain as
camera) and discerning their meaning (the mind as
photographer and editor).
We fully agree with the conclusion of the PCBE
that there is no such a thing as a ‘perfect’ memory,
just as there is no such a thing as a perfect human
life.
5 To be an imperfect being means, among other
things, having a memory that imperfectly renders
many imperfect things. To be creatures of space
and time means having a memory that is by nature
incomplete. And to be mortal beings means having
a memory that must ultimately fail. What we seek,
in other words, is not a perfect memory but a good
or excellent memory. But then the question reads:
what is a good or excellent memory? And what
does enhancement of our memory actually mean?
What diﬀerence would therapy make?
Therapy versus enhancement?
The PCBE’s report Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology
and the Pursuit of Happiness (PCBE, 2003) con-
tains some interesting thoughts on the distinction
between therapy and enhancement. Therapy is
described as the use of biotechnical power to treat
individuals with known diseases, disabilities, or
impairments, in an attempt to restore them to a
normal state of health and ﬁtness. Enhancement,b y
contrast, is the use of biotechnical power to alter,
by direct intervention, not disease processes but the
‘normal’ workings of the human body and psyche,
to augment or improve their native capacities and
performances. With this distinction between ther-
apy and enhancement it was hoped that we would
be able to distinguish between acceptable and
dubious or unacceptable uses of biomedical tech-
nology.
At ﬁrst glance, the distinction between therapy
and enhancement seems a useful way to distinguish
between the central task of medicine and its
marginal activities in enhancing ‘normal’ bodily
and mental capabilities. However, the distinction
between therapy and enhancement is ultimately
inadequate for the moral analysis of the use of
memory enhancing techniques (Kass, 2003). As is
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enhancement itself is highly problematic. In its
most ordinary meaning, it is abstract and
imprecise. Moreover, ‘therapy’ and ‘enhancement’
are overlapping categories: all successful therapies
are enhancing, even if not all enhancements
enhance by being therapeutic. Even if we take
‘enhancement’ to mean ‘non-therapeutic enhance-
ment,’ the term is still ambiguous (Parens, 1998a,
b; Juengst, 1998). When referring to a human
function, does enhancement mean making more of
it, or making it better? Does it refer to bringing
something out more fully, or to altering it quali-
tatively?
Beyond these conceptual ambiguities, there are
difﬁculties deriving from the fact that the notions
of both ‘enhancement’ and ‘therapy’ are dependent
on the complicated notions of health and normal-
ity. For the purpose of this paper it may sufﬁce to
recall that there is no clear-cut distinction between
health and disease (or illness) and between normal
and abnormal. Most human capacities fall along a
continuum – often a normal distribution curve. Let
us again consider the categories AD, MCI, ‘benign
age associated memory impairment’, and the group
of elderly people with ‘normal’ memory. This series
represents a continuum in the level of cognitive
functioning retained by different people with
increasing age. Where precisely do we have to
draw the line between normal and abnormal? For
AD patients it is statistically normal and inherent
to their disease to have memory problems. Yet it is
called therapy when this weakened memory is
enhanced. The syndromes MCI and ‘benign age
associated memory impairment’ are medical con-
structions and far from being clearly deﬁnable
disorders. As a consequence, drawing a precise line
between patients exhibiting these syndromes and
elderly people with a ‘normal’ memory is a rather
arbitrary exercise.
We thus agree with the PCBE that relying on
the distinction between therapy and enhancement
in order to decide on the moral acceptability of a
particular intervention in the brain will not suc-
ceed. Arguments about whether or not something
is an ‘enhancement’ can often get in the way of the
proper ethical questions: What are the good and
bad uses of biotechnical power? What makes a use
‘good,’ or ‘acceptable’? For example, it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that a drug is being
taken solely to increase ‘normal’ concentration,
that its use is objectionable. Conversely, certain
interventions to restore functioning wholeness
might well be a dubious use of biotechnical power.
The meaning and moral assessment of the use of a
medical technique such as memory enhancement
must be tackled via other means than the distinc-
tion between therapy and enhancement. Might the
extent to which MEDs affect the self be a criterion?
Memory and the self
In what way do drugs, which affect mood, cogni-
tion and memory, also enhance the self? And what
does it mean to ‘enhance the self’? Should this be
thought about in terms of doing something differ-
ent from curing a mental or biological disorder?
Questions like these were the starting-point for this
thematic section of Medicine, Health Care and
Philosophy on ‘Psychopharmacology and the Self’.
Rephrased and focused on the subject of this
paper, the crucial problem can be stated as follows.
The term ‘memory enhancing drugs’ suggests that
these drugs do indeed enhance memory. Apart
from the problem what ‘memory’ and ‘enhance-
ment’ then mean, the question is whether MEDs
also enhance the self? We suggest that this question
must be answered in the negative. Apart from the
problematic distinction between therapy and
enhancement it must be recalled that MEDs are
only partially and minimally eﬀective and under
very speciﬁc conditions. They certainly improve
certain learning processes, but do they improve
memory? And even given the fact that MEDs – be
it in a minimal way – positively aﬀect learning
processes and memory building, it is still ‘a long
way’ to the self: the enhancement of memory is not
necessarily identical to enhancing the self.
We realize that this statement presupposes a
speciﬁc view of the self. We conﬁne our selves in
this paper to two conclusions. First, debates on the
meaning of ‘the self’ are more appropriate in
relation to the development and use of a certain
class of antidepressants, the selective serotonin-
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) of which ﬂuoxetine
(Prozac) is the best known (DeGrazia, 2000;
Svenaeus, 2007), than in the context of MEDs.
The simple reason is that – given the present state
of development – SSRIs are more eﬀective in
improving our mood than MEDs are in improving
our memory. The question of how the self is
inﬂuenced by the use of MEDs might possibly
become a philosophical challenge in the future, but
is now relatively unimportant. Second, central in
the debate about neuro-enhancement is the fear
that neuroscience gives room to all kinds of
reductionistic and deterministic views of the
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biomedical memory research and research into
MEDs might indeed lead to a reductionistic view
of human memory and the self. An example is
Ledoux’s book Synaptic Self (Ledoux, 2002).
In modern psychology, the notion of the self is
closely tied in with consciousness, in the sense of
being self-aware, possessing conscious control,
having self-knowledge and self-esteem. Ledoux
has a broader view of the self in which elements
from the unconscious aspects of the self also play a
role. He describes a way of thinking about the self
that is compatible with current understanding of
brain functions. According to Ledoux, most of
what the brain does is accomplished by synaptic
transmission between neurons. He calls memory
the ‘‘synaptic result’’ of learning (Ledoux, 2002,
p. 9). Given the crucial role of synaptic transmis-
sions in functions of the brain and based on the
view that the self is in part made and maintained
by memory, he arrives at the conclusion that ‘‘your
‘self’, the essence of who you are, reﬂects patterns
of interconnectivity between neurons in your
brain’’ (Ledoux, 2002, p. 2). The central question
of Synaptic Self is therefore not how consciousness
comes out of the brain, but rather how does our
brain make us who we are? (ib., p. 10). In a later
article Ledoux (2003, p. 298) writes: ‘‘Because you
are a unique individual, the particular multifaceted
aspects of the self that deﬁne ‘you’ are present in
your brain alone. And in order for you to remain
who you are from minute to minute, day to day,
and year to year, your brain must somehow retain
the essence of who you are over time. In the end,
then, the self is essentially a memory, or more
accurately, a set of memories.’’
Realizing that this short description does not
fully do justice to Ledoux’s position,
6 we draw two
conclusions from it. First, this approach to mem-
ory and the self is based on the fundamental role
synapses play, which makes it easy to understand
the neurobiological basis of memory loss in AD.
Research over many decades has produced exten-
sive knowledge of the molecular cascade occurring
during memory formation. However, the whole of
these molecular processes does not explain memory
itself. It merely describes the brain events involved
in making it (Rose, 2004).
Second, we call Ledoux’s view of the self ‘one-
sided’ compared with holistic, in particular narra-
tive, interpretations of the self. The difference is
not that a reductionistic view is static and a
narrative view dynamic. Ledoux emphasizes, for
example, the dynamic aspects of the self, be it that
the dynamics of the self in his view are based on a
continuous change of synaptic interactions. The
difference is that narrative interpretations of the
self take their point of departure at the mental side
of human existence. Numerous authors have
argued that the narrative view adds a fundamental
way of attributing meaning in our lives and that
constructing stories about the self is linked to the
construction of our selves. In addition to the
individual’s role in constructing his or her self
through narrative conﬁguration, elements of dia-
logue are also important (Kinsella, 2005). A
narrative conﬁguration of the self involves not
only a reﬂexive relationship of self to self, but also
a relationship of self to others (Ricoeur, 1992). We
think that this dialectic and relational dimension of
the self is crucial in understanding patients with
AD and may inspire a more holistic view of the self
in AD compared with a reductionistic ‘synaptic’
position.
Alzheimer’s Disease and MEDs
The current literature describes AD as a syndrome
combining a set of clinical features with speciﬁc
neuropathological characteristics. Genetic factors
play a role as well (Dekkers and Olde Rikkert,
2006). Memory dysfunction is generally the ﬁrst
and most severe cognitive impairment in AD.
7 The
progressive mental decline, which is caused by AD
is feared by many people. Lay people as well as
caregivers consider dementia as a degrading state
accompanied by unbearable suﬀering due to the
loss of independence and personality.
8 In the
concluding chapter of a reader on the biological,
clinical and cultural perspectives of AD, Peter
Whitehouse writes: ‘‘Alzheimer disease (AD) is a
malignant threat to the quality of life of aﬀected
individuals as well as to the quality of life of the
human race in the future. Our ability to recognize
the challenges and dangers that lie ahead will be
critical in determining whether we can make
appropriate personal and social responses to this
condition’’ (Whitehouse, 2000, p. 291). In the last
lines of the same chapter he writes: ‘‘However the
concept of AD changes, the disease will likely play
an important role in the future of our world and
our conceptions of human personhood. Loss of
intellect is perhaps the greatest challenge to the
post-Enlightenment person who (over)values cog-
nition. Neuroscience will play a critical, but not the
dominant role in addressing the threat of demen-
tia’’ (Whitehouse, 2000, p. 304).
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tion of AD in our modern ‘‘hypercognitive’’ society
as a ‘‘malignant’’ disease and the need of a
personal and social response to AD. This negative
perception of AD seems to go hand in hand with
an awareness of a challenge for the future in which
much room is being reserved for the neurosciences.
The need for further research on the enhancement
of cognition and memory is partly grounded in an
awareness of the severe cognitive failures in AD.
This might explain why AD is mentioned in the
majority of state of the art articles about MEDs
(Whitehouse et al., 1997; Farah et al., 2004; Kan-
del, 2005). ‘‘The war on Alzheimer’s disease and
other cognitive ravages of aging is stimulating an
intensive eﬀort to develop drugs to improve
cognitive function,’’ Mehlman (2004, p. 483)
writes.
9 This approach might also explain why
people with dementia are the subjects of many drug
trials (Simard and Van Reekum, 1999).
Regulatory authorities both in the US and in
Europe have licensed anti-dementia drugs when
such a treatment proved to be signiﬁcantly superior
compared to placebo treatment in two of the three
following domains: cognition, activities of daily
living, and clinical global impression. These out-
comes (of which only cognition is obligatory)
clearly connect research in anti-dementia drugs to
MEDs. However, recently many authors and
licensing authorities have argued that cognitive
endpoints are an insufﬁcient assessment for anti-
dementia drugs. Additional criteria such as time to
nursing home admission and cost-efﬁciency calcu-
lations have been regarded as at least equally
meaningful. In addition, many researchers feel that
other clinical questions should be answered before
the next generation anti-dementia drugs deserves
to be registered. What effects do these drugs have
on mood, functional status, quality of life, care-
giver burden, and dementia progression? It is
argued that we should try to deﬁne outcome
measures in real life studies on dementia drug
treatment that are more closely linked to the
patients’ and caregivers’ preferences. Thus, the
similarity between MEDs and anti-dementia drugs
is their focus on the cognitive dimension. The
difference between the two is that the effect of anti-
dementia drugs should be measured in the ward,
rather than against purely cognitive parameters.
Finally, a current objection to all kinds of new
medical technologies is the danger of an unequal
access to these techniques and unfairness in the
distribution of resources (Bailey, 2003). The distri-
bution of MEDs on a free market would have
anti-egalitarian consequences. The rich and healthy
would get access to brain enhancements ﬁrst, and
would thus acquire a greater competitive advan-
tage over the poor and people already suﬀering
from cognitive disorders. In our view, this is a
serious criticism of the use of MEDs, even though
it is not speciﬁc to MEDs, because it is an objection
to any kind of biomedical intervention. Others,
however, hold that MEDs and other neurophar-
macological drugs are likely to be more equitably
distributed than, for example, genetic enhance-
ments, and as a result might increase social
equality. It has even been argued – as Mehlman
(2004) does – that competent adults should be free
to decide whether or not to use cognition enhanc-
ing drugs and that, if these drugs are suﬃciently
safe and eﬀective, the government should subsi-
dize access to them. Our fear is that – in the best
case – people with dementia and other forms of
cognitive decline will bear the burden of the
development of eﬀective MEDs and people with a
‘normal memory’ will share the beneﬁts. The ﬁrst
group will contribute much to the development of
MEDs, but will beneﬁt less from the results. In
the race for new and more eﬀective MEDs the
implications of the research and subsequent
implementation of these drugs for AD patients
deserves more attention.
Conclusion
In this paper we focused on some philosophical
questions related to the development of MEDs
and anti-dementia drugs. Biomedical research in
these ﬁelds appears to be a strong impetus for
rethinking what we mean by ‘memory’, ‘enhance-
ment’, ‘therapy’, and ‘self’. We conclude (1) that
the enhancement of memory is still in its infancy,
(2) that current MEDs and anti-dementia drugs
are only partially and minimally effective under
speciﬁc conditions, (3) that ‘memory’ and
‘enhancement’ are ambiguous terms, (4) that
there is no clear cut distinction between enhance-
ment and therapy, and (5) that research into
MEDs and anti-dementia drugs increases the
tendency to take a reductionistic view of the
human mind and of the self.
It is not our intention to stimulate a pessimistic
view of dementia by putting so much emphasis
on the vulnerability of persons with dementia and
on the alleged ‘loss of self’. However, even if one
describes dementia and the ways one can treat it in
more optimistic terms, there still exists a strong
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‘‘doing better’’, anti-dementia drugs aim at ‘‘doing
less worse’’. The world of MEDs is coloured by
utopian thinking and a belief in the human
capacity to overcome all kinds of bodily and
mental limitations in human existence. The world
of MEDs is a world of hopes for better bodies,
better souls and better lives, in sum the world of
hybris. What seems to be undervalued or denied in
the world of MEDs is precisely that which char-
acterizes the world of dementia: the steady mental
decline, severe memory problems, all kinds of
vulnerabilities and a gradual loss of self.
Despite the difference between these two
worlds, they are intrinsically linked. In the search
for MEDs it is often people with AD who are the
subjects of clinical trials. MEDs are aimed at
improving memory, which is the crucial cognitive
function that is affected in persons with AD.
Finally – and more importantly – it is the con-
frontation with human (cognitive) vulnerability, so
characteristic of people with dementia, which is the
basis for the utopian thinking and the drive to
search for MEDs.
Notes
1. See also, for example, the mission statement of the
World Transhumanist Association: ‘‘The World
Transhumanist Association is an international non-
proﬁt membership organization which advocates the
ethical use of technology to expand human capaci-
ties. We support the development of and access to
new technologies that enable everyone to enjoy bet-
ter minds, better bodies and better lives. In other
words, we want people to be better than well’’
(http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/in-
dex/ accessed on april 14, 2006). Also the website of
the Center for Cognitive Liberty and Ethics (CCLE)
with its focus on the ethical aspects of the individ-
ual’s right to control her own brain is illustrative
(http://www.cognitiveliberty.org). See also book titles
such as The Memory Bible (Small, 2002) and The
Memory Workbook (Mason et al., 2001).
2. In a recent survey 666 out of 671 articles on the eﬀect
of cognitive enhancers in healthy individuals showed
no eﬀect or even a slight worsening (A.R. Cools, per-
sonal communication).
3. The following list of statements and objections to
MEDs (Baily, 2003) might serve as a philosophical
agenda: Neurological enhancements (1) permanently
change the brain, (2) are anti-egalitarian, (3) are self-
defeating, (4) are diﬃcult to refuse, (5) undermine
good character, (6) undermine personal responsibility,
(7) enforce dubious norms, (8) make us inauthentic.
4. Explicit memory can be split into ‘semantic’ and ‘epi-
sodic’ memory. Remembering that the ﬁrst of January
is New Year’s Day is semantic. Remembering the New
Year party you went to last year is episodic. The most
vulnerable form of memory is episodic.
5. It is mostly in relation to the imperfections of memory
that interesting questions arise with respect to neuro-
ethics. Much cited in this context is Schacter’s list of
seven fundamental categories, seven ways memory
fails, called by him ‘‘seven sins of memory’’ (Schacter
2001): (1) transience: decreasing accessibility over time;
(2) absent-mindedness: lapses of attention, forgetting
to do things; (3) blocking: temporary inaccessibility of
stored information; (4) misattribution: attributing
memories to an incorrect source, false recognition; (5)
suggestibility: implanted memories; (6) bias: retrospec-
tive distortions produced by current knowledge and
beliefs; (7) persistence: unwanted recollections that
people cannot forget
6. If Ledoux asserts that synapses are the basis of our
personality, he does not assume that our personality is
totally determined by synapses. It is rather the other
way around. Synapses are simply the brain’s way of
receiving, storing, and retrieving our personalities, as
determined by all the psychological, cultural and other
factors (Ledoux, 2003). Finally, he does not commit
himself to a straight materialist position, that is that
the mind is a product of the brain: ‘‘Although I believe
that my mind (and yours) is the product of a physical
system, I don’t outright reject other ways of thinking
about the mind. Reductionism is a good approach to
brain research, but isn’t necessarily a good principle
for guiding us through daily life ...’’ (Ledoux, 2002, p.
327).
7. The deﬁnition of Alzheimer Europe, for example,
reads: ‘‘Alzheimer’s disease [is] a degenerative disease,
which slowly and progressively destroys brain cells.
It is named after Aloı¨s Alzheimer, a German neurol-
ogist, who in 1907 ﬁrst described the symptoms as
well as the neuropathological features of Alzheimer’s
disease such as plaques and tangles in the brain. The
disease aﬀects memory and mental functioning (e.g.
thinking and speaking, etc.), but can also lead to
other problems such as confusion, changes of mood
and disorientation in time and space’’ (http://
www.alzheimer-europe.org, accessed on November 21,
2005).
8. Dementia is generally characterized by decline, vulner-
ability, loss of the most important cognitive functions
and even a loss of self. It is often thought that demen-
tia is characterized by a gradual disappearance of that
which makes a being a human being. In the literature
the emphasis is often on what is gone. However, one
can also ask what remains. The question, then, is not
what kinds of capacities are absent, but what capaci-
ties are still intact. It is beyond doubt that persons
with (severe) dementia are incompetent to make ra-
tional, explicit and deliberate decision, but this lack
of explicit decision-making capacity does not
MEMORY ENHANCING DRUGS AND ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE 149automatically imply that no remains of the self are left
(Dekkers, 2004).
9. Donepezil, rivastigmine, galantamine, memantine, and
modaﬁnil are examples of these drugs.
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